In a striking Israeli reading of the transformations in the Middle East, Professor Uzi Rabi believes that the Houthis are no longer content with controlling Yemen, but rather seek to transform from an Iranian card into an independent geopolitical player, capable of influencing Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, and the global trade movement. However, the irony, according to this reading, is that every Houthi attempt to prove power, in turn, increases the intersection of the interests of the countries of the region, most notably Israel and Saudi Arabia, to contain this expansion.
According to an article by Professor Uzi Rabi on the Israeli Walla website, understanding the Houthis requires reading them in two languages at the same time: the Yemeni language and the regional language. Whoever reads in only one language misses the whole scene.
The Yemeni reading, according to Rabi, tells the story of a local authority. The Houthis effectively control the largest and most important part of Yemen, running governance institutions, collecting taxes, operating security services, and dealing with a devastated economy, a humanitarian crisis, tribal tensions, and internal criticism. In this context, as is often the case, survival is the essence of the game.
But a regional reading tells a very different story. Here, the Houthis are no longer just a local authority. Rather, they seek to be the controlling force over Bab al-Mandab, one of the most important strategic bottlenecks in the world, and to become the party capable of influencing freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, energy pathways, and global supply chains.
In other words, Rabe believes that the Houthis want to move from being an Iranian asset to an independent geopolitical asset. These are not marginal ambitions, but rather a change in the way of thinking.
He points out that their relationship with Tehran remains deep and clear to this day, but the Houthis are seeking to move beyond the position of “arm” or “branch.” They want every discussion of any regional arrangement to pass through them as well. From their point of view, every launch towards Israel, every threat to ships in the Red Sea, and every combat statement by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi are not just military actions, but rather a political statement that says: It is no longer possible to shape the Middle East without taking us into account.
This is where the paradox begins, according to the article. The more the Houthis succeed in the regional arena, the greater the danger they bear in the Yemeni arena. As long as they were fighting for control of Yemen, Saudi Arabia had an interest in finding a way to reduce the confrontation. Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Crown Prince, wanted to get out of the Yemeni quagmire in order to allocate his resources to “Vision 2030”, develop the economy, and consolidate Saudi Arabia’s regional position. From here, contacts with the Houthis arose and an attempt to reach a settlement.
But the Houthis read reality differently. From their point of view, the Saudi readiness for dialogue was not an expression of strength, but rather of fatigue. It was not a desire to turn a new page, but rather evidence that Saudi Arabia wants to avoid a renewal of the war at almost any cost. Thus, the settlement was considered a recognition of their power rather than a mutual settlement.
This, according to Rabi, is precisely the reason why Houthi rhetoric has recently become more intense. This does not necessarily mean that the Houthis are stronger than ever, but rather the opposite may be true. The Middle East after the direct confrontation between Israel and Iran is different from what they knew. Iran is under pressure, Hezbollah has lost a large part of its capabilities, and Syria is no longer the strategic depth it once represented.
In this reality, the Houthis realize that they are becoming the central asset of the “axis of resistance,” but they are also becoming its central target. Precisely for this reason, they are trying to increase the cost of targeting them by expanding threats towards Israel, towards shipping lines, and even through hints towards Saudi Arabia.
It is also for this reason that Rabi cautions against rushing to take messages from Sanaa at face value. Combat rhetoric may be an expression of self-confidence, but sometimes it may be an attempt to hide a feeling of fragility, deter opponents, and maintain a regional position that is being tested.
In Riyadh, according to the article, they are well aware of this shift. The unusual statements recently issued by Saudi Arabia, which included warnings of a harsh response to any Houthi threat to the Kingdom, indicate that Saudi patience is not unlimited. If previously it seemed that Saudi Arabia was willing to pay almost any price to avoid an additional war in Yemen, today it understands that unlimited concessions may specifically encourage the Houthis to expand their appetite.
At this point, the interests of Saudi Arabia and Israel converge. According to Rabi, there is no military bond between them against the Houthis, and there is no need to exaggerate talk of public coordination. But the two countries read the same strategic map.
From Israel’s perspective, the Houthis threaten Eilat, freedom of navigation, and the ability to ensure safe passage in the Red Sea. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, they threaten its southern borders, the ports of Yanbu and Jeddah, its energy facilities, and “Vision 2030.” As for Egypt, they pose a threat to the Suez Canal. As for the global economy, they threaten one of the world’s vital trade routes.
Here, according to the article, the new Middle East appears. The regional order is no longer based only on solid alliances and ideological camps, but also on interest groups. Israel and Saudi Arabia do not need to sign an alliance to understand that any Houthi strengthening changes their strategic environment for the worse. It is enough for each of them to reach the same conclusion, even from a different angle.
This is the entire Houthi paradox: the more the Houthis try to prove that they are an unassailable regional power, the more they create around them a wider circle of countries that have a common interest in stopping them. In their attempt to impose a new regional order, they may actually accelerate the formation of another order, less dependent on slogans and more tied to common interests.
