“Lebanon Debate”
Attention is turning to the Ali al-Tahir Heights in light of Israel’s declaration of “operational control” over it, while sources close to Hezbollah deny control over the depth of the heights. Between two narratives that have not yet been resolved on the ground, a question arises beyond the borders of the hill itself: Does the development constitute an Israeli military gain, or a new card to impose field realities on the negotiating table?
The strategic expert, retired Brigadier General Bahaa Halal, said in an interview with Lebanon Debate, “Reading what happened in Ali Al-Tahir Heights requires separating between three basic levels, which are the reality of Israeli control over the land, the military value of the site, and the way Israel is employing this development politically and negotiated,” stressing that the narrative on the ground is still, as of the afternoon of September 4, not settled independently.
A political reality before the field reality is complete
He explained that Israel announced “operational control” of the Ali Al-Taher Heights yesterday, noting that it had cleared tunnels and underground facilities, while sources close to Hezbollah denied that Israeli forces had taken control of the depth of the heights, and said that the incursion was limited to the outskirts of the bush. He pointed out that Reuters, in turn, reported that the field situation had not been independently verified.
Halal considered that there is, most likely, real Israeli progress on the ground, but there is not yet sufficient evidence to say that Israel has imposed firm and complete control over the entire Ali Al-Taher Heights, explaining that the difference is important between “operational control” and “complete occupation.”
He pointed out that the expression “operational control” could mean that Israeli forces have become able to operate within the region, destroy facilities, move in them, and deprive the opponent of using them, without necessarily meaning establishing a fixed and sustainable deployment at all points of the highland.
He pointed out that the continued Israeli bombing of the region, in conjunction with bombings and targeting operations, raises question marks about the extent of the stability of field control, and whether it has actually turned into a final and stable reality.
On the other hand, the source stressed that the Israeli announcement should not be treated as mere propaganda, stressing that a real military operation took place in the highlands, and that the Israeli forces were able, according to their account, to reach underground structures and tunnels and destroy or clear some of them.
He believed that Israel may, at the same time, be employing the field development as a moral and media achievement, with the aim of influencing public awareness and benefiting from the announcement politically and negotiated, and perhaps within broader regional calculations based on luring Iran to respond, which may open the door to a broader confrontation between Iran and Israel, which in turn would lure the United States and affect the existing understandings in the region.
In this context, he pointed out that Israel is using what can be described as “manufacturing political truth by announcing it before the field truth is complete,” explaining that announcing control may shift the discussion from the question “Did Israel control Ali Al-Taher?” To a completely different question: “When will Israel withdraw from Ali Al-Taher?”
He stressed that this shift in the nature of the discussion gives Israel an important negotiating card, as the reality announced by Tel Aviv becomes a starting point for any subsequent political discussion, instead of waiting for the field verification of it to be completed.
He pointed out that this makes the statements of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu more important than a mere military announcement, especially after Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz announced that controlling Ali al-Taher strengthens the “security zone,” and that Israel will not withdraw from the site before disarming Hezbollah.
He considered that Israel had thus moved from a military operation to declaring control, then to an attempt to establish a new security reality, all the way to linking the withdrawal to a political condition related to the disarmament of Hezbollah, stressing that this series reflects an integrated strategic path, and not just a limited tactical operation.
Regarding the military value of the height, the source confirmed that Ali Al-Taher is an important position, but he does not represent Hezbollah’s “center of gravity” in the comprehensive strategic sense, and therefore his fall, if proven, does not mean the fall of the party or the collapse of its system.
The importance of Ali Al-Taher
He explained that the importance of Ali al-Taher is related to its being a high point that allows fire and visual control over a wide area, its proximity to Nabatieh, and its geographical connection to the Zawtar-Iqlim al-Tuffah axis, in addition to the possibility of using it for surveillance, reconnaissance, and linking movement between sectors of the south.
He added that the location of the height gains additional importance because of its location north of the Litani, which makes it part of the complexities associated with the current Israeli equation in the south.
He stressed that controlling Ali Al-Taher does not mean dismantling Hezbollah, explaining that even if its downfall is proven militarily, Israel will have achieved an operational, negotiating and symbolic gain, not a “final strategic victory” over the party.
Hezbollah’s ability is not measured by hills
He stressed that confusion between the location and the system may lead to a misreading of developments, pointing out that Hezbollah’s ability is not measured by the number of hills it can lose, but rather by a set of factors that include leadership, organization, resources, social environment, ability to redeploy, missile capability, political and regional depth, and the ability to survive after strikes.
He believed that the main question should not be whether Ali Al-Taher had fallen, but rather whether Israel was able to transform control over her into a serial collapse of the Hezbollah system south and north of the Litani, noting that there are not yet sufficient indicators that would allow it to be said that such a collapse has begun.
He pointed out that the stories circulating are still contradictory, as Israeli sources talk about clearing structures and tunnels, while sources close to Hezbollah say that most of the important elements and facilities were transferred previously, stressing that these data require independent field verification.
Regarding the political aspect, the source suggested the return of negotiations, but in a different form than the stage that preceded the recent developments, considering that Israel does not necessarily need to stop the diplomatic track in order to continue its military progress, but rather it can use the field facts to change the terms of the negotiations.
He explained that what is happening can be described as “negotiating under the roof of field facts,” so that the Israeli message becomes that the negotiation is no longer about what Israel will do, but rather about how to stabilize the reality it has created on the ground.
He pointed out that the announcement of control over Ali Al-Taher came almost simultaneously with the continuation of the process of releasing Lebanese prisoners and talking about the next Rome round, pointing to the release of four additional Lebanese within the framework of an American-brokered arrangement, while there are still expectations for talks in Rome later in the month.
He stressed that this does not mean the end of the diplomatic path, but rather it may make it more necessary, albeit from a more stringent Israeli position.
Halal warned that if Israeli control over Ali Al-Taher is established, it is unlikely that Israel will deal with it as a separate military operation and end there. He is likely to try to turn it into a link in a chain that begins by establishing control over the height, then strengthening the security zone, linking any withdrawal to disarmament, and putting pressure on neighboring regions, all the way to using the new facts at the negotiating table in Rome.
He pointed out that the Israeli statements linking the withdrawal to the disarmament of Hezbollah reinforce this possibility, considering that the real battle is no longer linked to the hill alone, but rather to the question of whether Ali al-Taher will be the last point of Israeli expansion, or the first point in redefining the Israeli security zone north of the Blue Line.
Halal stressed that Ali Al-Taher is not “Hezbollah’s Stalingrad,” and that her fall does not mean the fall of the party or the end of the resistance project in Lebanon, but he considered that it may turn into a “negotiating Stalingrad” for Israel, meaning that Tel Aviv may seek to transform a military site of limited strategic value into a symbol of the success of the strategy of imposing a fait accompli.
He concluded: “The real danger lies not only in the fact that Israel has taken control of a hill, but in its success in getting the international community to deal with this hill as part of the “security zone” before negotiations over it begin, which may make the battle over the political and field narrative of Ali Al-Taher no less important than the battle over the land itself.”
