Alan Sarkis – Call of the Nation
Tomorrow is the anniversary of the Greater Lebanon Declaration. The memory of an entity born on the basis of land, borders and state. But the irony is that Lebanon enters this anniversary today while it fears for the same elements on which it was founded. Fear is no longer just political. There is fear on the ground and for the state, and fear for the national decision.
In the South in particular, the question is no longer just when the war will end, but what will remain after it. Will all Lebanese lands return to state authority? Do the military incidents end at the ceasefire borders? Or will the field results turn into new arrangements that impose themselves on Lebanon?
Fear on earth is the first danger. Any loss of an area of southern land, and any establishment of a new security reality, means that Lebanon is facing a dangerous precedent. Borders are not preserved with statements, and sovereignty and arms control are not restored with statements. What is proven on the ground may later become part of any settlement, and therefore the battle for the south is not only military, but rather over the shape of the future Lebanon. Hence the sensitivity of the stage, because any negotiation conducted under pressure from the field and Iran’s adherence to Lebanon makes the latter pay a greater price than it expects.
The second fear is for the regime. The state faces a severe test. Institutions exist, but their ability to impose national decisions remains questionable. The longer the war lasts, the greater the gap between the state and the powers that have influence and the ability to influence the field. The problem is not only in the government or the Council of Ministers. The problem is who decides in Lebanon and who owns the decision on war and peace. If the decision remains divided between official institutions and de facto forces, then talk about a fully sovereign state will remain incomplete.
Then comes the third fear, which is external interference. Iran is at the heart of this scene, and Hezbollah is the primary tool for its influence on the Lebanese arena. As the regional confrontation continues, Lebanon becomes more vulnerable to becoming an arena for messages and pressure. Tehran and Washington have their accounts. As for Lebanon, it must bear the consequences. This is the most dangerous equation.
So September will be different. The month begins on Tuesday, but all indications indicate that the heat in the field will remain high. The negotiations in Rome have not yet been scheduled, and there are still no indicators that allow us to say that a settlement is close. The war continues, and the political messages have not reached a decisive stage, while the south remains open to several possibilities.
In this context, circulating information stops at the file of Ali Al-Taher, amid talk that Hezbollah would prefer to fight and hand him over to the Israeli army rather than hand him over to the Lebanese army. If this information is correct, the issue is no longer just a security file. The issue becomes directly related to the concept of the state. How can a country regain its sovereignty if an armed party prefers to deal with the Israeli army in a file in which the Lebanese army is supposed to be the authority? The question here is bigger than Ali Al-Taher. The question is who owns the decision on the ground?
Information from “Call of the Nation” reveals that the Iranian side informed the Americans of its adherence to the Lebanese front. If these data are confirmed, it means that Tehran still views the Lebanese arena as part of its regional equation, and that the decision to calm this front will not be separate from Iranian-American calculations. In practice, this means that the crisis will remain open, and that reaching a settlement will not be easy.
And the timing makes the scene more complicated. Israel is approaching its elections, and the United States is approaching its midterm elections. Each party wants to access its rights from a stronger position. Each side wants additional cards on the table. Each party is trying to improve its conditions before the political entitlement begins. Among these accounts, Lebanon remains the weakest link.
This is why the anniversary of September 1 this year comes in an exceptional circumstance. Greater Lebanon, which celebrated its birth more than a century ago, today fears for its land, borders, and decision-making. The danger is not in the war alone, but in the day that follows it. The danger is that the results of the field will turn into new borders, that external settlements will turn into internal rules, and that the Lebanese decision will remain divided between the state, the arms, and the outside.
September may indeed be great, but not in the sense that the Lebanese want. It may be great by the size of the confrontation, the size of the negotiations, and the amount of pressure to which the state will be exposed. The coming days will be decisive. Either Rome opens the door to settlement, or the field continues to draw the facts. Either the state regains the initiative, or the vacuum expands.
