Translation of “Lebanon Debate”
The increasing pressure on Iran in the Strait of Hormuz may push Tehran to search for an alternative card to regain its ability to influence. At the heart of the proposed scenario is Lebanon, where Hezbollah may once again become the first tool to launch an escalation that will lure Israel, put pressure on the Gulf states, and bring Washington back to the negotiating table.
According to a report by Maariv, based on the analysis of Israeli researcher Eyal Ofer, the most important transformation for Tehran is currently taking place in the maritime arena, as Iran faces difficulties in exporting its goods and entering products through the Strait of Hormuz, while its opponents in the region benefit from alternative export paths, most notably the Saudi and Emirati oil pipelines.
In addition, according to Ofer, the Commander of the US Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper, announced the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to free navigation, which led to a reversal of the equation that Iran had previously benefited from to threaten navigation and raise the level of pressure.
Ofer said that “the hourglass has turned,” explaining that if Tehran had previously used the threat of closing Hormuz as a pressure card, time is now working against it, and the continuation of the blockade may lead to increased economic and strategic pressure on it.
Ofer believes that, when it finds itself under pressure, Iran resorts to deliberately creating escalation in various arenas with the aim of raising the cost on regional players, and then using the new crisis as a card in the negotiations. According to his assessment, Tehran does not necessarily seek a quick agreement, but rather to impose a long and exhausting path that allows it to improve its negotiating position.
He added: “The Iranian way out of crises was and will remain to produce additional escalation in the region,” considering that the Iranian leadership realizes its need to raise the level of pressure again before returning to the negotiating table from a better position.
At the core of this scenario is the Lebanese arena. According to Ofer, Iran’s dealings with Hezbollah are radically different from its dealings with Hamas. While Tehran views Hamas as a card that can be sacrificed, Hezbollah constitutes an integral part of the Iranian power system in the region, and therefore it will work to ensure its survival.
Ofer believes that the existing arrangements between Lebanon and Israel undermine the model of proxies that Iran has built over the years, which may prompt it to try to undermine them through a Hezbollah movement in southern Lebanon.
The scenario does not necessarily assume that the party will launch widespread fire into Israel, but rather it may resort to targeting Israeli army forces in areas where it is still able to move, in a way that imposes an Israeli response.
Ofer believes that such an operation will be timed so that the Israeli response becomes the focus of international attention. If Hezbollah succeeds in injuring Israeli soldiers and Israel responds forcefully, Tehran may seek to build a narrative that holds Israel responsible for starting the escalation.
The scenario, according to the analysis, is based on launching limited activity by Hezbollah that would elicit an Israeli response, and then using this response to justify Iran or its agents moving to a higher level of escalation. Ofer also likely carries out such attempts at sensitive times, such as weekends or holidays, with the aim of doubling the effect of targeting Israeli forces.
But the ultimate goal, according to Ofer, goes beyond the Lebanese arena, as Iran may seek to trigger a broad regional escalation before the American elections, which would also harm the interests of the Gulf states.
In this scenario, vital facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, including energy and water desalination facilities, may become potential targets, while Ofer raises a more extreme possibility of Iran carrying out a ground action against Kuwait.
The goal, according to his analysis, is to push the Gulf states to exert intense pressure on Washington to stop the escalation, in parallel with an Iranian attempt to hold Israel responsible for the deterioration.
Ofer concludes that the pressure imposed on Iran may increase its incentive to create a new crisis, after the transformation of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz led to the erosion of one of its most prominent cards of power. Thus, Hezbollah may become the first point at which Tehran tries to ignite the fire, not with the aim of launching an all-out war immediately, but rather to generate a series of responses that will lure Israel, the Gulf states, and the United States, and redraw the balance of pressure on Iran.
