A huge Saudi-French deal worth approximately $7 billion seemed at first glance to be an entertainment and economic investment in the suburbs of Paris, but, according to an Israeli reading, it carries behind it a broader political path that reaches directly to Lebanon, and brings Resolution 1701 back to the forefront, in parallel with French-Saudi preparations to support the Lebanese army and strengthen the presence in Beirut.
According to an article by researcher and reserve lieutenant colonel Amit Yagur in the Israeli newspaper “Maariv”, the deal that was signed in recent days in Paris between French President Emmanuel Macron and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, during the latter’s visit to the French capital, showed a colorful economic face, as the Saudi investment company “Qiddiya” will finance the construction of a huge amusement park city on the outskirts of Paris, with an investment of about 7 billion dollars, which will lead to the creation of tens of thousands of job opportunities for the French economy.
However, Yagour believes that behind this economic scene lies a longer-term geopolitical step, considering that Macron is obtaining an important financial flow to the French economy through which he can be presented as a presidential achievement, while he believes that Mohammed bin Salman, for his part, is continuing the path of improving his image and buying political credit in the heart of Europe, in addition to showing an additional margin of independence from the United States and Israel, in a message that Riyadh has strategic alternatives.
According to the same reading, the real arena where interests intersect is not necessarily located in Paris, but in Beirut.
At the heart of the joint declaration by Macron and Mohammed bin Salman, Resolution 1701 issued by the United Nations regarding Lebanon returned to the forefront, as the two parties spoke in almost the same context about disarming non-state organizations, in a clear reference to Hezbollah, and about calling for a complete Israeli withdrawal, in addition to broad support that they intend to provide to the Lebanese army.
Yagour believes that France, which has failed in recent years to regain its position in Lebanon due to the absence of economic pressure tools, has now found a new entrance through what he described as “riding on the Saudi back.”
According to this scenario, France will provide diplomacy, international legitimacy, and a political platform, including the conference to support the Lebanese army scheduled to be held soon in Paris, while Saudi Arabia will provide the financial weight and Arab cover.
The writer believes that Lebanon has turned into something like a “test paper” for the entire Middle East, as the regional competition is no longer measured only by military strength and the size of the fires in southern Lebanon, but rather by the question of who will reshape Lebanon, and which axis will have the greatest influence in the reconstruction process and influence in Beirut.
In this context, Yagour identified 4 main axes that he believes are waging a strategic struggle over Lebanon.
The first axis is what he described as the Shiite-Iranian axis, which seeks, according to its assessment, to preserve the “dual state” model and recover from the blows it suffered, while using state institutions in Beirut as a cover for Hezbollah’s activity.
As for the second axis, it is the Turkish-Syrian axis, as it believes that Turkey is monitoring the vacuum within the Sunni street in Lebanon and is trying to deepen its civil and political penetration in the country, while at the same time the Syrian regime is studying ways to renew its previous forms of influence in Beirut.
As for the third axis, it is the French-Saudi axis, which, according to Yagur, presents a model for a “new regime” based on economic and military institutional reconstruction, and aims to remove both Iranian and Turkish influence, but according to conditions set by Paris and Riyadh.
As for the fourth axis, it is the American-Israeli axis, which seeks, according to the article, to reposition the Lebanese government and push towards future normalization within the path of the Abrahamic Agreements, in parallel with reducing the influence of external parties such as France, which the writer says has worked so far to preserve the old regime.
Regarding Israel, Yagur believes that the Franco-Saudi model appears on the surface to be an opportunity, because it proposes the disarmament of non-state organizations and the strengthening of state institutions, but it may carry, in his assessment, significant operational and political risks.
He believes that relaunching the discussion on Resolution 1701 under French leadership may mean installing “lax” implementation mechanisms, ignoring the immediate security needs of the Israeli army, in addition to providing international immunity to the Lebanese army without ensuring that Hezbollah’s structures are dismantled and that it is effectively disarmed.
The writer stressed that Israel, according to his point of view, is required to show a stronger presence in the Lebanese arena, and not to ignore the Saudi-French axis that is forming, especially since Saudi Arabia itself recently signed the “Mecca Agreement” alongside Türkiye and Pakistan, an agreement that the writer confirms is not directed against Iran.
Yagour believes that the absence of effective Israeli action may make the conference scheduled to be held in Paris to support the Lebanese army a platform that sets international rules that could restrict Israel’s movement in the future.
Regarding practical steps, the writer believes that Israel’s attempt to cancel the Paris conference or prevent it directly will most likely fail, and will increase friction with France, and will also put Israel in the position of the party that rejects settlements.
Accordingly, Yagur calls on Israel, in coordination with the US administration, to work from now on returning the initiative to the United States and Israel, and to formulate it in a way that is consistent with what he considers to be vital security interests.
It is first suggested that any American support or legitimacy for the Paris Conference be linked to the inclusion of clear red lines in the final statements, the most important of which is preserving the freedom of operational action of the Israeli army in order to thwart immediate threats and violations.
It also suggests that funds should not be transferred to the Lebanese army and economy in the form of a “blank check,” but rather linked to measurable criteria, including the actual dismantling of Hezbollah facilities, imposing active control on border crossings to prevent weapons smuggling, and establishing an external oversight mechanism led by the US Central Command (Centcom).
He adds that there are a large number of other steps that the Lebanese government must implement in parallel, and they do not fall exclusively within the military field.
The third step, according to his proposal, is to send a sharp diplomatic message to Saudi Arabia via Washington, stating that any financial investment in Lebanon without strict guarantees regarding disarmament may expose Saudi funds themselves to danger, because any future escalation may again lead to the destruction of infrastructure.
He also believes that any path towards regional normalization requires close security coordination with the United States and Israel, including in the Lebanese arena.
Yagour concludes that a strategy based on strict conditions, and based on coordination with Washington, may transform the Franco-Saudi path from a threat to Israel into a platform that imposes, from his point of view, harsh and intolerable conditions on the Lebanese government and the Lebanese army.
Thus, according to this reading, the $7 billion deal in Paris does not appear to be just an investment in an entertainment city, but rather part of a broader scene in which Riyadh’s money and Paris’s diplomacy intersect with the future of Resolution 1701 and the balance of influence in Lebanon.
