As the countdown to the end of UNIFIL’s mission begins, the question is no longer limited to the identity of the force that might fill the security vacuum in the south, but rather has moved to a more complex file: Who will take over the dozens of sites occupied by the international force, and what will happen to its equipment, supplies, maps, and field memory accumulated since 1978?
The answer may seem obvious: UNIFIL withdraws and the Lebanese Army takes over its positions. But the experiences of United Nations missions reveal that the matter is not that simple, because what are known as UNIFIL sites practically consist of multiple properties, each of which has a different legal and logistical path.
The land on which the center is based may be owned by the Lebanese state, a municipality, or a private party, while the buildings and equipment belong to the United Nations or to the participating state that established them. As for armored vehicles, trucks, weapons, communications devices, and field hospitals, most of them are classified as “unit-owned equipment,” meaning that they remain the property of the state that sent them to Lebanon and return to them when their soldiers withdraw.
Thus, everything left behind by international soldiers does not automatically become the property of the Lebanese Army. The transfer of any armored vehicle, mechanism, or device to it requires a clear decision to donate or transfer it. This is what happened in 2021, when the Korean battalion delivered ten armored personnel carriers to the army, in a declared and specific process, and not as an automatic result of the unit’s departure or a change in its mission.
As for assets owned by the United Nations, such as civilian vehicles, prefabricated offices, generators, water and sanitation systems, and logistical equipment, they are subject to a different arrangement. The organization initially tries to transfer what is suitable to other missions or to its logistical stock in Brindisi, then offers the surplus to UN agencies, organizations and local destinations, before resorting to commercial sales or grants to the host country.
The experience of the United Nations mission in Mali shows the clearest example of what may await southern Lebanon. Upon completion of the “MINUSMA” mission, 11 bases were closed and handed over to the Malian government, while the equipment of the participating countries and United Nations assets were transferred through collection points in ports outside the country in preparation for returning them to their owners or sending them to other missions.
After exhausting the transfer and sale options, the United Nations proposed granting Mali 1,530 assets, the purchase cost of which amounted to about $94.7 million, and included ready-made buildings, infrastructure, water and fuel supplies, and aviation-related facilities. The criterion was simple: what could be transferred at a reasonable cost was transferred, and what was too expensive to dismantle or would harm the local structure was left to the host country.
This model opens the door to the possibility of handing over to Lebanon an important part of the fixed facilities in Naqoura and major centers, including internal roads, fortifications, water and energy networks, warehouses, and some prefabricated buildings. But it does not guarantee the survival of mechanisms, technical devices, surveillance and communication systems, especially those belonging to the participating countries.
The Darfur experience provides a more serious warning. UNAMID handed over 14 sites to the Sudanese government for use in health, education, training and social services, and left 193 vehicles, 196 generators and a number of clinics and medical facilities to local communities. In return, the military units returned their equipment to their countries via large convoys heading towards the ports.
However, a number of sites that were handed over to the authorities were looted shortly after, and 8 bases were stripped of their contents, while other sites survived because local institutions entered them and operated them immediately. Here the most dangerous lesson for Lebanon emerges: It is not enough to sign a handover report. Rather, the new Lebanese unit must enter the site at the same moment, and must have a budget for guarding, operation, and maintenance. Otherwise, facilities worth millions of dollars will turn into abandoned structures.
The Lebanese experience in this field has already begun. In May 2021, UNIFIL handed over the “2-45A” site, located south of the town of Aita al-Shaab, to the Lebanese Army, after occupying it since 2012. On August 20, 2026, the Khardali-Litani site was handed over to the 7th Brigade, as part of a process that indicates the beginning of the transfer of some centers before the official end of the mission.
However, these two operations do not yet answer the larger question: Has the Lebanese state drawn up a complete map of all UNIFIL sites, and determined the ownership of each property, the contents of each center, the cost of operating it, and the military body that will receive it?
The problem does not lie only in who owns the building, but in the army’s ability to operate a vast network of sites in an area where large parts of its infrastructure have been destroyed. Each center requires personnel, machinery, fuel, communications, electricity, water, and maintenance, which means that handing over the sites without receiving part of their equipment or obtaining alternative funding may turn them into an additional burden on the military institution.
In addition to the centers and equipment, the most sensitive file remains: the information collected by UNIFIL during its long presence in the south.
The international force has an extensive archive of patrol records, violations, reports, photos, coordinates, tunnels, military sites, mines, and signs associated with the Blue Line. But this information is not legally treated like a building or an electric generator, and is not automatically transferred to the army once it hands over the keys to the center.
Documents prepared by the United Nations remain in its archives, while the information and encrypted devices used by the units return to the countries that own them. It is unlikely that any country will leave its sensitive communications systems or databases, but rather take them with them or disable them before leaving.
Therefore, Lebanon needs an independent protocol to transfer the necessary maps, technical databases, mine records, border markings and incident reports. Without this agreement, the army may receive the buildings, while the operational memory that allows it to use them within an integrated surveillance network will depart.
A very serious question also arises regarding the sites located within areas close to the occupation points or within areas in which it is difficult for the army to deploy. Who will take over these positions if UNIFIL withdraws before the complete Israeli withdrawal? Could some international sites turn into empty points vulnerable to control or destruction?
Mali’s experience demonstrated that the rapid deterioration in security forced the United Nations to evacuate bases before recovering all equipment from them. The Darfur experience has shown that sites that do not have direct protection may be looted even after they are officially handed over. As for the south, the danger is not limited to looting, but rather includes the possibility of Israel entering or destroying some sites under the pretext of preventing armed parties from using them.
Hence, Lebanon is not supposed to wait for the final months of the UNIFIL mission. What is required now is a comprehensive inventory that separates state lands from municipal and private property, and between United Nations property and equipment of participating countries, and identifies what will be transferred abroad, what can be purchased or obtained as a gift, and what must be handed over to the army.
Lebanon can negotiate with each country individually to retain part of its equipment, especially troop carriers, trucks, generators, field hospitals, and non-sensitive surveillance equipment. He can also request that part of the mission’s budget be transferred to an international program to support the operation of the sites that the army will receive, instead of leaving the military institution facing a vast network of facilities without sufficient funding.
The coming battle is not only over the maintenance of an international presence in the south, but also over a legacy worth millions of dollars and a field archive built over nearly half a century.
When the last international soldier leaves, the question will not be who lowered the United Nations flag, but rather who raised his flag in its place, and what was found inside the site: a working center with its maps and equipment, or an empty building after the mechanisms, systems and information were shipped abroad?
