“Lebanon Debate”
With the resumption of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiating track in Rome approaching, Ali Al-Taher Heights is turning into a delicate testing point between military escalation and political containment. Israel views the highland as a strategic location, while Washington is trying to keep the front under a roof to prevent the collapse of negotiations, in parallel with an Italian move to push for dialogue and new security arrangements in the south. Between Netanyahu’s field pressure, Hezbollah’s calculations, and Iran’s messages, Ali Al-Taher appears to be more than just a military target. It has become a negotiating card that may determine the shape of the next stage.
Military expert, retired Brigadier General Bahaa Halal, believed that the current stage should be read as a test of the balance between the negotiating track and the military track, and not as a mere possibility of a topical Israeli operation.
Halal said that, based on recent developments, Ali Al-Taher Heights has become one of the most sensitive choke points in the Lebanese-Israeli negotiation process, noting that Italy’s announcement of its continued role in advancing the dialogue, in parallel with what Washington reported about the resumption of the political track in Rome at the beginning of September, makes the field situation in the south directly linked to the negotiation track.
Could Netanyahu launch a pre-emptive operation?
Halal considered that the possibility of Israel carrying out a pre-emptive operation against Ali Al-Taher exists, but it is not the most likely scenario in the near term, explaining that Israel faces three conflicting motives.
He first referred to the military motive, explaining that Israel considers Ali al-Tahir a strategic location, and accuses Hezbollah of having a military structure and tunnels there. He added that the area had already been subjected to repeated Israeli strikes, while Israel announced on August 15 that a Hezbollah attack targeted its forces in the area.
The second motive, according to Halal, is the political motive, as Tel Aviv wants to enter the next round of Rome negotiations while it has a stronger field reality.
He said that military pressure on Ali Al-Taher may constitute, for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a means to improve negotiation conditions, and not necessarily a prelude to a comprehensive war.
But Halal stressed that the American factor remains the most important, explaining that the problem for Netanyahu is that forcibly controlling Ali Al-Taher at this moment may be interpreted by the Americans as an attempt to change the rules of the game before the next political round.
He added that this contradicts the path that Washington says has entered the implementation phase, including pilot areas and verification mechanisms.
Therefore, Halal suggested that if Netanyahu decides to act, he may prefer a limited and focused operation that relies on pressure and the gradual nibbling of the high ground, rather than a broad occupation operation, so that the military pressure remains below the threshold that could lead to the collapse of the American path.
He said: “Here lies the danger for Al-Taher; he may be an Israeli military target, but at the same time he has become an American negotiating card.”
What are the chances of the success of the Israeli operation?
Halal explained that a distinction should be made between three levels of success: air and fire success, field control, and transforming control into a sustainable political and security achievement.
He pointed out that Israeli air and fire success is very high, given Israel’s ability to cause significant damage in the region and target what it considers Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, in addition to its advanced capabilities in reconnaissance, intelligence, and precision strikes.
As for moving to a ground operation and field control, Halal believed that Israel also has a clear advantage, as a result of its superiority in reconnaissance, intelligence, and firepower.
But he stressed that the issue becomes completely different if the goal is to occupy the highland and turn control over it into a sustainable political and security reality.
He said that controlling a geographical point is one thing, and turning this control into a political achievement acceptable to the Americans and the Lebanese is another thing, considering that the chances of sustainable Israeli success in this case will be more complicated and less stable.
He explained that this point in particular makes Ali Al-Taher a problem for Israel, because the United States is pushing towards a formula in which the Lebanese army has security responsibility in the region within the model of experimental areas, and not Israel.
He pointed out that recent reports spoke of American pressure to transfer responsibility for Ali Al-Taher to the Lebanese army in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from one of the areas still under occupation, such as Bint Jbeil or Khiam.
He added that Israel’s entry into the highland by force and then its refusal to withdraw may give it a tactical victory, but it may create a strategic problem for it, especially if its continued presence conflicts with the American goals of the negotiating track.
Can Hezbollah thwart the operation?
Halal called for precision in approaching this issue, and said that the correct question is not: “Can Hezbollah prevent Israel from reaching Ali Al-Taher?”, but rather: “Can Hezbollah prevent Israel from converting military control into permanent strategic control?”
He answered that the party has a significant ability to obstruct this goal, even if it is not necessarily able to prevent the Israeli military operation itself.
He explained that Israel has a clear superiority in air power, intelligence, reconnaissance, and the ability to carry out precise strikes, while Hezbollah still possesses, according to its assessment, the ability to operate asymmetrically, raise the cost of any Israeli military presence, and prevent the region from being transformed into a safe and stable space for Israeli forces.
Halal said that a limited Israeli operation does not necessarily mean the fall of Ali Al-Taher strategically, suggesting a scenario based on an Israeli entry, followed by destruction, targeting, and partial control, then a response from Hezbollah, which raises the cost of the Israeli presence, so that Washington intervenes with pressure, before negotiations return to the forefront.
He added: “In other words, the battle may move from geography to politics.”
He stressed that if Israel was able to enter Ali Al-Taher but was unable to produce long-term security stability, then Hezbollah would have succeeded in preventing Israel from achieving its strategic goal, even if it was unable to prevent it from achieving tactical gains.
What about Iran?
Halal moved to the Iranian role, and said that Tehran sent clear political signals regarding support for Hezbollah, noting that the visit of MP Hassan Fadlallah to Tehran and his meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi came at a very sensitive time, coinciding with the escalation of Israeli strikes on Ali Al-Taher.
He pointed out that Iranian talk about the need to take “coordinated and decisive measures” against Israel, in addition to affirming support for Lebanon, carries a political message that goes beyond a mere diplomatic position.
But he pointed out, on the other hand, that Iran is facing American economic and political pressure and increasing sanctions, which makes any Iranian decision linked to broader calculations related to the cost of escalation and the possibility of exiting the circle of sanctions and pressure.
Could Iran intervene if Israel attacks Ali Al-Taher?
Hallal divided Iranian possibilities into three levels:
First: Political and diplomatic support, considering it the most likely possibility, as Tehran will work to raise the level of its political discourse, move diplomatically, and hold Israel responsible for thwarting the negotiating path.
Second: Direct support for Hezbollah, explaining that Iran may be looking for a formula that allows it to support the party without going directly into a comprehensive confrontation with Israel and the United States.
Third: Direct military intervention, which is the most sensitive scenario, because Iran’s direct entry into the confrontation line because of Ali Al-Taher may give Israel and the United States a justification to expand the conflict from the Lebanese arena to the Iranian arena, which is what Tehran is trying to avoid in light of the current pressures.
On the other hand, Halal believed that Iran’s failure to act in the event that Hezbollah was subjected to a major strike might also leave a strategic cost in terms of Iranian support for the party and the concept of the “axis of resistance.”
Therefore, it is likely that Tehran will search for a middle area, so as not to leave Hezbollah alone, but at the same time avoid engaging in an all-out war.
Roma and Ali Al-Taher: a military battle or a negotiating card?
At the conclusion of his reading, Halal pointed out that Rome itself has become part of the deterrence equation, with the Italian role continuing to facilitate dialogue, in parallel with Washington setting early September as the date for resuming the political track.
He believed that Netanyahu may use Ali Al-Tahir to put pressure before the Rome negotiations are held, but if he decides to move, he will try not to make the process cross the threshold that forces Washington to choose between supporting him and protecting the negotiating path.
It is also likely that Netanyahu will seek to avoid a direct Iranian response, and instead go for a gradual and calculated escalation.
Halal concluded by saying that the real battle over Ali Al-Taher is not only about who can control the highland militarily, but rather who can determine its future politically and security-wise, considering that the central question in the next stage will be: Who owns the highland militarily, and who has the right to determine its fate politically?
