The new Israeli plan for southern Lebanon does not appear to be a withdrawal in the actual sense, as much as it represents an attempt to redraw the borders of the region that Israel wants to keep under its military control, by moving from the current “yellow line” to what Israeli security circles have begun to call the “gray line.”
According to a report by the Israeli Broadcasting Authority, the security establishment is considering a significant reduction of the forces deployed in southern Lebanon, and withdrawal from some advanced sites, in exchange for establishing a new security belt extending inside Lebanese territory at a distance ranging between 3 and 4 kilometers from the border.
The plan, which has not yet been completed and has not received approval from the Israeli political level, stipulates the construction of new military sites along the proposed line, where Israeli forces will be stationed under the pretext of protecting the northern settlements and preventing Hezbollah from approaching the border again.
But the numbers alone reveal that there is no talk of a complete withdrawal. Maintaining Israeli forces at a depth of up to 4 kilometers practically means continuing the occupation of a wide strip that includes Lebanese towns, neighborhoods, and agricultural lands, and deprives large numbers of people from returning to their homes and investing in their lands.
The absence of an official map of the “gray line” leaves the door open to basic questions: What villages will fall within it? Will it be drawn according to a fixed distance from the border, or according to the heights and military sites that Israel wants to keep? Does it include parts of Al-Khiyam, Mays Al-Jabal, Aita Al-Shaab, Al-Adissa, Kafr Kila, Naqoura and other border towns?
The presentation of the plan, according to the Israeli narrative, is linked to the completion of operations in Ali al-Taher Heights and the destruction of the infrastructure and tunnels that Israel says it found inside the hill. The Israeli security establishment believes that controlling the heights allowed it to reconsider the size of its deployment and choose a defensive line closer to the border.
However, moving from an advanced location to another, shallower location does not eliminate the root of the problem. The plan, even in its most reduced form, keeps Israeli forces inside Lebanese territory, and links complete withdrawal to security and political conditions that have not yet been determined, including the deployment of the Lebanese army, the future of Hezbollah’s weapons, and the results of the negotiations sponsored by the United States.
The leaking of the “gray line” may be part of a negotiating process rather than a final military plan. Israel can present the reduction of its forces as a concession, while practically maintaining a belt inside Lebanon and demanding from Beirut, in return, steps related to the exclusivity of weapons and security arrangements south of the Litani.
The most dangerous question remains related to the fate of the areas from which Israel may withdraw: Will it be handed over directly to the Lebanese army within a clear timetable, or will it leave them as destroyed and exposed areas subject to Israeli surveillance and fire?
So far, there is no final map, no Israeli political approval, and no agreement with Lebanon on the implementation mechanism. Therefore, the “gray line” remains a leak that is under investigation, but its meaning is clear: Israel is not discussing ending its occupation of southern Lebanon, but rather is looking for a formula that is less militarily expensive and more marketable, through which it maintains a security strip within Lebanese territory.
Thus, the color of the line and its name may change, but its essence remains the same: an occupation retreating a few kilometers to reestablish itself on new Lebanese land.
