-Mohamed Alloush
Today, the calculations of Lebanese internal politics are intertwined with the changes in the region and the military developments and discussions it is witnessing. The internal debate about the nature of the relationship with Israel has returned, and has moved from whispered conversations to a public discourse adopted by some official bodies.
But the current prevailing narrative, which claims that a “Lebanese majority” wants direct negotiations and peace, seems closer to wishful thinking than reality when tested on the ground of political reality.
Leading sources in the Shiite duo believe that the current composition of the Parliament does not reflect this claim that some forces are trying to promote. The recent positions issued by major powers, regardless of their differences, indicate the presence of an important bloc that has reservations about heading towards direct negotiations with Israel, especially in the current format.
The sources point to the move of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is leading a calm political path with the aim of re-establishing the rules of negotiating engagement within the “indirect” framework, and preventing the country from sliding into a path that does not enjoy sufficient national support and in light of a bad negotiating agenda.
These sources confirm that Ain al-Tineh has become, in recent weeks, the center of a series of meetings aimed at building a minimum level of political consensus around red lines that cannot be crossed. In this context, the visit of former Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt came, which had more than one significance. The statement he made after the meeting, when he set the limit of what was possible with a developed truce agreement that was compatible with the current realities, was an indication that a large sector of political forces were heading towards a cautious approach that refused to jump to the headlines of “peace” in its direct meaning.
On the other hand, the position of the Free Patriotic Movement stands out as an additional element in this balance. Although the movement does not reject the idea of negotiation categorically, it links any path to complex political and sovereign conditions, which practically places it in the category of objector to the current push for power. This vision, according to the sources, contributes to strengthening the position of opposition to direct negotiations within the Council, or at least in preventing the formation of a strong majority that supports it, contrary to what is being promoted.
The matter is not limited to these two forces, as there are the national positions of the head of the Marada Movement, Suleiman Franjieh, who maintained the stability of his positions despite all the changes, in addition to the visit of Representative Hassan Murad to Ain al-Tineh, and the signs that accompanied it, which, according to the same sources, reflect the existence of a Sunni parliamentary mood that is not enthusiastic about moving forward on this path, especially after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s clear intervention and its attempt to calm the enthusiasm of some to bypass the Arab guarantor of any negotiating path.
These data gain special importance in light of the talk about “cross-sectarian coverage” for any strategic option of this kind, as the absence of such coverage weakens the legitimacy of the proposal from its foundations.
In this sense, the political movement revolving around Ain al-Tineh seems closer to a process of “gathering oppositional forces,” seeking to redefine the limits of what is possible in Lebanese politics. According to the sources, the matter is not only about rejecting the principle of direct negotiation, but also about reaffirming a new old equation, which is that any strategic shift in Lebanon’s position cannot be made by a unilateral decision, nor through a selective reading of the internal balance of power.
This dynamic, according to the sources, reflects a conflict between two visions for Lebanon. The first sees the regional moment as an opportunity to reposition itself and join the paths of normalization taking place in the region. The second considers that any step of this kind, in light of the imbalance of power and with the continued occupation and threat, constitutes a political adventure that may open the door to uncontrollable concessions and may lead to a complete blow to the Lebanese formula.
The irony is that this conflict is not resolved, according to the desire of some, by falsifying the numbers for and against within Parliament, but rather by the intersection of interests and concerns between the different forces. And here precisely lies the importance of the movement led by Ain al-Tineh, as it seeks, according to the sources, to transform this circumstantial intersection into a more coherent political position, capable of imposing itself as an actual alternative to the path that the authorities are pushing toward Israel.
So, it becomes clear that talk about a “Lebanese majority in favor of direct negotiations” is just an illusion, not supported by opinion polls or political positions. Therefore, those concerned must take the advice of the Socialist Party delegation that visited Baabda and begin a comprehensive national dialogue that charts the course of the next stage instead of hiding behind false allegations.
