As the deadline set by the Iraqi government for the pro-Iranian militias to hand over their weapons approaches, developments suggest that the file is gradually moving from statements to field steps. However, what is happening may not constitute an actual dismantling of Iranian influence, but rather a transition from large, visible militias to small, secret cells that are difficult to track.

According to a report by Dr. Zoe Levornick at the “ALMA” Center, the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is demanding that weapons be placed in the hands of the state, while September 30 has been set as the date for the end of the presence of international coalition forces in Iraq. However, some of the organizations most closely linked to the Revolutionary Guards, led by the Hezbollah Brigades and Al-Nujaba, still refuse to give up their independent military capabilities.

A report by Al-Hurra channel, based on Iraqi security sources, reported that the Revolutionary Guard established a network of secret cells, each of which included between 5 and 10 members selected from major militias, some of whom received training in Iran. These cells operate separately and are directly linked to the Iranian mission in Iraq, away from local leadership.

According to the report, members of this network participated in drone attacks targeting Erbil and sites in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. They move under civilian cover, use regular cars, and move the drones between different locations to make it difficult to detect them.

If this information is correct, Tehran will be prepared to reduce the appearance of the militias, integrate some of them into state institutions, and allow the surrender of part of their weapons, provided that it maintains a secret nucleus linked to the Revolutionary Guards and capable of carrying out attacks, sabotage and deterrence operations.

This possibility is reinforced by information that spoke about the Speaker of the Iranian Shura Council, Muhammad Baqir Qalibaf, during his visit to Baghdad, discussing proposals to freeze heavy weapons or hide them and transfer some of them temporarily to Iran. Thus, the Iraqi government obtains an apparent achievement, while the capabilities remain preserved and can be restored when circumstances change.

On the other hand, reports spoke of a militia handing over about 20 Iranian-made drones and missiles with a range exceeding 100 kilometers to the government near Baghdad, in the presence of American representatives. However, the identity of the faction was not revealed, nor did Baghdad announce the size of its remaining arsenal, which prevents confirmation of whether the step was a serious dismantling or a limited measure to avoid US sanctions.

Although the Iraqi government has softened its tone and moved from talking about “confining weapons” to “regulating” them, it is continuing negotiations to avoid an internal confrontation. This path may allow factions to procrastinate, hide weapons, and maintain their chains of command under legal or official cover.

But the Iraqi experience, even if it was partially successful, is not a ready-made model for Lebanon. The Iraqi militias are distributed among dozens of organizations with different leadership and interests, and the government can co-opt some of them and isolate others. As for Hezbollah, it is a central organization that brings together the military force, the political party, and the social network under one leadership.

Hezbollah also represents the most important strategic assets that Iran has built outside its borders, and gives it direct military capabilities from an arena adjacent to Israel. Therefore, Tehran’s willingness to reduce the appearance of some Iraqi militias does not mean its willingness to abandon the party’s military power.

Hezbollah, in turn, has not shown a real willingness to disarm, but rather links any discussion to Israel’s withdrawal, stopping attacks, and achieving a set of security and political conditions. Even if one of them is achieved, he will still be able to add new conditions, as the Iraqi factions do.

Therefore, success is not measured by hiding weapons or changing the names of organizations and merging them formally, but rather by transferring weapons, the chain of command, and decisions about war and peace to the state. This is precisely what there are so far no indications that Hezbollah or Iran are willing to accept.