The military operations led by the United States and Israel against Iran, which began at the end of last February, dealt a painful blow to Iran’s naval capabilities. Air and sea strikes resulted in the destruction or disabling of dozens of ships, threatening to radically change the balance of maritime power in the Gulf region.
According to an article by Harrison Cass in The National Interest magazine, the military operations that began on February 28 have so far led to the destruction or disabling of more than 60 Iranian ships, as part of a focused naval strike campaign targeting Iran’s infrastructure and surface fleet.
The writer quoted the Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, as saying that the ships that were destroyed or disabled included a wide range of naval vessels, including major combat ships, support and command ships, missile launching and mine-laying ships, in addition to fast attack boats and submarines. The losses include ships belonging to both the Regular Iranian Navy (IRIN) and the Revolutionary Guard Navy (IRGC Navy), which together have between 250 and 300 naval vessels of various sizes and capabilities.
The report indicates that the remainder of the Iranian fleet is experiencing a state of severe decline and organizational disintegration, after losing a large part of its capabilities during only two weeks of fighting.
Prior to this campaign, Iran’s maritime strategy relied on a mixture of conventional and unconventional capabilities, including frigates, missile boats, submarines, mine-laying operations, and speedboats used in “mass attack” tactics. The main goal of this naval doctrine was to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply passes, giving Iran an effective deterrent capability in regional sea lanes despite not having a long-range naval force.
Among the most prominent ships that were destroyed or disabled during the campaign was the IRIS Dena Moudge-class frigate, which is considered one of the most advanced Iranian combat vessels. It was reported that it sank after being hit by a Mark 48 torpedo launched by a US Navy submarine, in the first combat sinking of a large warship by an American submarine since World War II.
The IRIS Shahid Bagheri drone carrier, a modified commercial ship intended to launch drones at sea, was also destroyed during precision raids that targeted it while it was docked in the port of Bandar Abbas. The huge logistics support ship “IRIS Makran”, a modified oil tanker that was used as a floating operating base for drones, helicopters and special forces, was also severely damaged.
The losses also included the destruction of the corvette “IRIS Jamaran” during the first strikes on naval bases, in addition to the injury or destruction of the frigates “Sahand” and “Sabalan” during attacks targeting naval facilities.
In addition to the large ships, the strikes also focused on Iran’s unconventional fleet, where 16 mine-laying ships were destroyed near the Strait of Hormuz and 10 other ships inside the ports, in addition to a large number of fast attack boats that form the backbone of the “maritime congestion” tactics adopted by Iran.
The writer believes that these losses represent a strategic blow to Iran’s ability to threaten navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, as the loss of surface ships and mine-laying capabilities makes imposing a naval blockade more difficult. The destruction of ships such as “Shahid Bagheri” and “Makran” effectively puts an end to Tehran’s ambitions to possess a naval force capable of operating outside its regional scope.
Although Iran still possesses a limited number of submarines, coastal missile platforms, and some irregular boats, these capabilities appear limited compared to the fleet it possessed before the outbreak of the campaign, which may force it to reconsider its naval doctrine and perhaps launch a rebuilding process that may take many years.
