In an in-depth analysis of what is known as Iran’s “long arm,” Nitzan Sadan, the Israeli military writer, reviewed in his report the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal, indicating the most important missile families developed by Tehran, and explaining the distinctive features of each category in terms of range, speed, accuracy, and launching mechanisms, in addition to the nature of the risks that may result from a broader military confrontation.

The report confirms that Iran has developed five main families of ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel, and that understanding the differences between them is necessary to assess the level of the real threat, indicating that a large part of the capabilities promoted in the media may remain within the “theoretical” framework rather than a practical reality.

The first family: “Shehab” – the most common… but its intelligence imprint is clear

The Shahab family (which means “meteor” in Persian) traces its roots back to the Iran-Iraq War, when the Iranians realized they lacked an effective response to waves of ballistic missiles launched by Saddam Hussein.

According to the report, Iran began purchasing Scud missiles from Syria and Libya in 1985, and later from North Korea, before completely dismantling them and re-engineering them locally. By 1988, it was able to build domestic production capacity, and has continued to gradually improve these missiles to this day.

The writer points out that the “Shahab” missiles are the most common in the Iranian arsenal among the missiles capable of reaching Israel, but most of them rely on liquid fuel, which means that they need time to refuel before launch, which creates a logistical delay and an intelligence imprint that is difficult to hide and limits the element of surprise.

This family includes models such as the old “Shahab 3”, the “Imad”, which Iran described as extremely accurate, and the two-stage “Qadr 110”, in addition to the “Qiam”, which has a range that exceeds the ability to reach Israel even if launched from western Iran.

The report notes that the launch pads for this family’s missiles are huge and rely on very long trucks, which makes hiding them more difficult compared to other models, as they require protection convoys and support teams, which increases the level of monitoring before launch.

“Imad” and “Qadr” are considered the most important in this group, with a range of up to 2,000 km and a warhead ranging between half a ton and a ton. Some versions may also include cluster warheads carrying between 12 and 36 submunitions that are fired in the final stage of the fall.

Although advanced models of this family have satellite navigation components to improve accuracy, the report questions the effectiveness of this in the field, noting that many of the missiles that were not intercepted did not hit their targets with great accuracy.

The writer adds that the flight path of “Shahab” missiles is often high (may reach 500 km), which makes them relatively easy to detect and intercept, considering that they may be used mainly to create “numerical pressure” on air defenses by launching large quantities in a short time.

The second family: “Fatah” – the most dangerous due to solid fuel and maneuverable warheads

The report believes that the “Fatah” family (meaning “the Conqueror” in Persian) is the most diverse within Iran’s arsenal, and that it is one of the most tactically sensitive families.

Its beginnings also go back to the phase of the Iran-Iraq war, when Iranian engineers re-engineered a Soviet artillery missile known as the 9K52 “Luna”, before it was later transformed into a more accurate and reliable version called “Zelzal 2” in 1996, and then developed into actual ballistic missiles such as the “Fath 110”, which entered service in 2002 and takes advantage of satellite navigation to achieve a better hit within a range of 300 km.

The most important difference in this family is that it relies in many of its models on solid fuel, which gives it an almost instantaneous launch capability without the need to refuel, and makes transporting and concealing it easier compared to the “Shehab” family.

According to the report, this family has expanded to include multiple models, most notably:

“Persian Gulf” anti-ship missile with a radar guidance head

“Fatah 360” with a range of 120 km via a launch pad with six tubes

“Fatah 313” with a range of up to 500 km

“Open Opening” with a camera in the front for visual guidance that is difficult to confuse

Mini “Ababil” suitable for marine use

The development of an air-launched version is also not ruled out.

But the most dangerous in this family, according to the author, is the presence of 3 models that have more powerful engines and “maneuvering” warheads capable of adjusting the course during the final landing, making it difficult to calculate the course and intercept it.

“Khyber Shekan”

The report estimates the speed of this missile at “Mach 8 to 9,” and its range is 1,450 km with a warhead weighing about 550 kg, which means that striking Israel would require launching it from western Iran, which may limit flexibility of use.

The “Khyber Shekhan” is characterized by a much smaller launch platform than the “Shahab” platforms, as one truck can carry two missiles. There is also a version that can be hidden inside a seemingly “normal” truck covered with cloth, which increases the possibility of its use in populated or hidden areas.

“Haj Qassem”

It is larger, heavier, and consists of two stages, allowing it to maintain acceleration for a longer period and reach a speed of approximately Mach 13, with a maneuvering warhead weighing about 500 kg.

Iran claims that it is resistant to jamming, but the report indicates that Tehran is facing difficulty in manufacturing complex solid fuel engines after the damage to the production infrastructure during the past year, which suggests that the number of this type is limited.

“Open 1”

Iran has promoted it as “uninterceptable,” under the pretext that it launches a warhead with an independent engine and maneuvers during landing, but the writer downplays the value of this propaganda, stressing that most ballistic missiles are “hypersonic” in nature, and that this type has also been intercepted, especially after the Houthis used them over the past year.

The report adds that “Fatah 1” has a relatively lighter warhead (about 350 kg) because the warhead requires special fuel, and it also takes a lower altitude path of about 135 km, which may make it discovered a little late.

The third family: “Khorramshahr” – heavy missiles with huge warheads and fears of multiple warheads

The third family is “Khorramshahr”, named after a city in western Iran that witnessed major battles during the war with Iraq. These are heavy missiles designed to carry huge warheads that may reach 1.8 tons.

The report explains that it is based on North Korean Hwasong-10 missiles, which have their roots in a Russian design originally intended for launching from submarines, which explains their short and thick shape that allows them to carry large amounts of fuel.

The writer points out that the diameter of the “Khorramshahr” missile reaches about 1.5 meters, compared to about a meter in “Imad” and “Qadr,” and only about 76 cm in “Fatah,” which gives it the ability to carry huge warheads, multiple warheads, or large cluster munitions of up to 80 small bombs.

The report notes that at least one of these cluster warheads was used in the field, but did not cause significant damage.

The most dangerous threat is the possibility that the missile possesses multiple independent explosive warheads (MIRV) that separate in space and turn into several targets that must be intercepted individually, but the report confirms that this capability was not clearly demonstrated, and the extent of its actual readiness is not known.

The writer considers that the most dangerous model in this family is “Khorramshahr 4”, also known as “Khaybar”, as it can carry a warhead weighing 1.5 tons for a distance of 2000 km, with the possibility of making trajectory adjustments during the flight phase outside the atmosphere to improve accuracy.

The report also quotes the Iranian media as saying that the missile may be flying at a very low altitude of approximately 126 km, but it casts doubt on the veracity of this information and suggests that it may be a misleading attempt to reduce the possibility of predicting its path.

It is noted that “Khorramshahr” operates on liquid fuel, which gives it a relatively faster preparation capacity compared to some other liquid missiles, but it remains a complex and expensive weapon, and the writer believes that the number of these missiles is limited, with large and easy-to-monitor launch platforms.

The fourth family: “Sajjil” – pure Iranian production and a range that extends beyond the region

The fourth family is “Sajjil” (meaning “Sulfur”), and the report describes it as the “most authentic” Iranian missile, as it is not merely a development of a foreign model but rather a complete local production.

“Sejil” is a huge two-stage missile that relies on solid fuel, and is classified as one of Iran’s longest-range missiles, as estimates indicate its ability to reach 2,500 kilometers or more, that is, farther than Israel and deep into Europe.

The weight of their warheads ranges between half a ton and 1.5 tons, but like other heavy missiles, they are expensive and rare, and their launch platforms are huge, and the report also suggests that their trajectory is very high, making it easy to monitor and intercept them.

Fifth Family: “Fatah 2” – The newest threat: a gliding missile moving at tremendous speed

The report concludes with the family of “hypersonic maneuver” missiles, which currently includes one model known as “Fatah 2,” which the author considers the most interesting.

He describes it as being close to “Fatah 1” in terms of weight, lightness, reliance on solid fuel, and a rapid launch platform, but the main difference lies in the shape of the warhead, which resembles a small plane, with large fins and a flat design that allows for the generation of lift during flight.

According to the report, “Fatah 2” launches at a sharp angle upward and then descends quickly before launching the head, which begins the “glide flight” phase dynamically into space, by lowering the nose to gain speed and then rising again. This is a mechanism that gives it greater maneuvering ability than traditional zigzags, while maintaining high energy until reaching the target from a range that may reach 1,800 km.

The author warns that this type, due to its speed, low trajectory, and maneuverability, may pose the greatest challenge to defense systems compared to traditional models.

However, the report indicates that Israeli defenses still possess advanced interception capabilities, and it also mentions that Iranian reports indicated that the warhead may use liquid fuel, which means that it also requires a fueling process that complicates the launch.

Between theory and reality: The threat exists… and Iran is good at “patching up” after strikes

In his conclusion, the author stresses that all of the above remains within the framework of “declared and theoretical” capabilities, especially since, during the months following Operation “With Kalbiyya,” Iran was exposed to major damage to its missile production and development facilities, which forced it to manufacture missiles quickly and under less than ideal conditions, and to use Chinese equipment as an alternative to local equipment that was specifically designed for the Iranian industry.

But on the other hand, the report warns against underestimation, considering that “tinkering” and creativity under pressure are among Iran’s oldest skills, citing its previous ability to re-engineer F-14 fighters during the US embargo, copy advanced drones, and even analyze the Israeli “Spike” missiles it obtained through Lebanon.

Therefore, the writer considers that the danger is not only related to the accuracy or modernity of the missile, because “even a bad missile is capable of reaching and exploding,” stressing that high interception rates do not mean the absence of danger, as there is no “complete air defense” in any war.