– Mohamed Alloush
The meeting between US President “Donald Trump” and the Prime Minister of the Israeli enemy “Benjamin Netanyahu” constituted an important political milestone that defines the features of the region with the advent of the new year. The question that arises strongly on the scene and behind the scenes is: Are we on the verge of a comprehensive war? But the answer to this question cannot be a definite yes or a complete negation, because realism requires distinguishing between the desire for war and the actual ability to achieve its goals.
There is no doubt that the war option is progressing in the thinking of “Benjamin Netanyahu,” and in the mind of the extremist Israeli right, over any other option. “Netanyahu” needs war politically and in his internal battle, so the confrontation remains open on all fronts, albeit at a different pace. But desire alone, no matter how great, is not enough to ignite major and comprehensive wars. The most important question remains: Does Israel, along with the United States of America, have the ability to translate this desire into a political, military, and strategic achievement that achieves the declared and hidden goals?
In this context, the Iranian file stands out as a major priority in the Israeli vision, and a cornerstone in the American approach to reshaping the region. According to leading sources in the Shiite duo, the Twelve Days War, with all its clamor and escalation, did not achieve the ambitions of Tel Aviv and Washington, as it did not overthrow the regime and did not break the Iranian state. Therefore, the sources indicate that the option of war on Iran is still strongly on the Israeli mind, but it is a conditional option, because everyone knows that a war of this magnitude cannot be waged without direct American participation, and it cannot be justified unless it is capable of achieving the ultimate goal, which is overthrowing the regime in Tehran.
These sources believe that the decision of war on Iran is not related to media escalation or limited strikes, but rather to the extent of the ability to achieve the final goal. Therefore, if the Israelis and Americans had guarantees, even if they did not reach the point of complete certainty, that the war was capable of overthrowing the Iranian regime, they would not hesitate for a moment to launch it. But the current facts and the prevailing political and military logic do not indicate this conclusion. Therefore, work is underway on a parallel track that depends on luring Iran to the negotiating table, but with harsh conditions that have not yet been reduced, accompanied by a continuous policy of threats, increased economic and political pressures, and persistent attempts to exploit any internal movements or discontent, in the hope of imposing change from within.
However, these sources do not rule out the existence of an illogical factor in the scene, which is the possibility that Israel and the United States possess hidden surprises, or invisible tools, which may be military or security, that may make the current reading of the situation incomplete. This possibility, although unlikely according to the available data, remains in the calculations of the parties concerned, based on experiences during the past months.
As for Lebanon, the sources confirm that the track is inseparable from the broader regional context. When the Israelis informed the Egyptian side of their intention to strike Iran, they clarified at the same time that they wanted, before that, to direct strikes at Hezbollah and the Houthis, or at least obtain a clear commitment from one or both of them not to engage in any major war alongside Iran. This clearly reflects that the Lebanese front is read in Tel Aviv as a decisive element in any comprehensive regional confrontation.
According to this reading, what “Donald Trump” said about Lebanon after his meeting with “Netanyahu” did not carry anything new. His description of Hezbollah as “behaving badly” is expected, and no one expects an American president to say otherwise. His talk about the Lebanese government being in a “somewhat unfavorable situation” falls within the same framework, as pressure will continue on the government, and it will remain subject to shortcomings, as long as what is required American and Israeli is the transition to a new stage of restricting weapons and disarming the elements of power from the resistance. From here, these sources do not see in “Trump’s” words any surprise or change in the American approach towards Lebanon.
The war on Lebanon, in its logic and goals, is very similar to the war on Iran. The central question is the same: Can the war achieve the goal? In the Lebanese case, the goal is clear, which is to end the resistance, disarm it, and change the internal balance of power. The answer, according to logic and available facts, is no. There is no real ability, through war, to achieve this goal, unless Israel has exceptional hidden data, similar to what it had before the September 2024 war.
These sources recall the experience before the September 2024 war, when almost all analyses, data, and facts indicated that a comprehensive war was unlikely, before it later became clear that Israel possessed deep security and information breaches that changed its calculations. However, even in light of those hidden data, Israel was unable to achieve all of its goals in Lebanon, just as it did not succeed in achieving its goals in Iran, despite what it possessed of tools and capabilities.
In contrast, when it is said that the current logic does not indicate a comprehensive war on Lebanon, this conclusion is also based on the American opinion, which believes that what wars have failed to achieve during more than four decades of conflict can be achieved through a combination of diplomacy, threat, economic and political pressure, and controlled Israeli military attrition. From this standpoint, these sources suggest that the American reliance on this path will continue in the coming stage, at least, while keeping the door open to a deliberate Israeli escalation, which may include major strikes or assassinations at a high level, and perhaps expanding the buffer zone in some points, without sliding into a comprehensive war, unless the data changes dramatically.
In conclusion, logic does not impose the occurrence of a comprehensive war, but logic alone is not enough to assert that it will not occur. Consequently, the door remains open to the possibility of surprises, which is what everyone threatened by Israel realizes. As for the surprises, if they exist, they are outside the framework of time and place.
