This fleet relies on “old ships that have been redirected and operate under false flags, and operates outside traditional shipping and insurance systems.” Transfers take place in remote, out-of-sight areas, where shipments are unloaded from one tanker to another in order to conceal the Iranian origin of the oil.
Available data indicates “an increasing reliance by Chinese refineries on Iranian, Russian, and Venezuelan oil, taking advantage of deep discounts that are reaching their highest level in a year.” These shipments are an important source for independent refineries in China, despite the “risks associated with violating sanctions.”
Last month witnessed “a new round of US sanctions targeting 24 ships belonging to the shadow fleet, in addition to a Chinese crude oil terminal and an independent refinery.” This round represents “the fourth round of sanctions imposed by Washington on Chinese refineries involved in importing Iranian oil.”
Maritime authorities in Malaysia face “significant challenges in monitoring illegal transfer operations due to limited resources and the vast maritime area.” The “blackout techniques used by the Iranian fleet” further complicate tracking the movement of these shipments.
The future is expected to see “further escalation as Iran continues to develop its methods to circumvent sanctions, while Washington increases pressure on buyers.” In return, “increased risks may prompt some Chinese importers to re-segment their dealings with Iranian oil.” (Al-Ain)
