Six months after the outbreak of the US-Iranian war, losses are accumulating without a final settlement, while the repercussions of the confrontation have gone beyond the military field to the Iranian nuclear program, energy markets, international navigation, and the balance of power in the Middle East, so the question remains open: What did Washington and Tehran achieve, and what did they lose?
The latest assessments indicate that the US and Israeli strikes caused significant damage to Iran’s military capabilities and facilities related to its nuclear program, but they did not end Tehran’s ability to launch attacks and maintain missile capabilities. Reuters describes the scene as a “costly stalemate,” with continuing military and economic repercussions and the absence of a settlement that would end the confrontation.
Since the beginning of the war, the American strategy has been linked to weakening Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities, destroying part of the military infrastructure, and reducing Tehran’s ability to support its regional allies.
However, the six months showed a gap between the size of the strikes and the political results. Some military goals have been achieved, while other goals remain controversial, especially regarding permanently preventing Iran from rebuilding its nuclear and missile capabilities.
In this context, Dr. James Russell, a professor of national security and former Pentagon official, believes in statements to Al Arabiya that the United States has not achieved its main strategic goals, most notably limiting the Iranian nuclear program and reducing the missile capabilities and influence of Tehran’s allies, considering that Iran has retained basic tools to influence the region’s equations.
But Iran’s continued fighting does not mean that it emerged from the confrontation without losses. The strikes caused great damage to its military capabilities, affecting air defense systems, naval forces, and missile capabilities, while its economy was subjected to additional pressures due to the war and sanctions.
According to assessments reported by Reuters, Tehran, despite this damage, still maintains missile and drone capabilities that allow it to continue attacks.
The war bill did not remain limited to its two parties, but rather extended to the energy, trade, and shipping sectors, especially with the disruption of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The Center for Energy and Clean Air Research estimates that fossil fuel importers paid about an additional $330 billion during the past six months, as a result of the high costs of imports of oil, petroleum products, and liquefied natural gas related to the Strait crisis.
Hormuz has become one of the most prominent pressure cards in the war, after the disruption of navigation through it affected global energy supplies and transportation costs.
According to a report by the Associated Press, reopening the Strait, through which a large portion of global oil trade passes, has become a major goal of the US administration as the confrontation continues, after the focus at its beginning was focused more on the nuclear program and Iranian military capabilities.
For his part, the writer and researcher at Al-Ahram Center for Studies, Dr. Bashir Abdel Fattah, said in statements to Al-Arabiya that it is still too early to issue a final ruling on the winner and the loser, as both parties have pressure cards, but they also suffered losses, while the repercussions spread to the international community through the disruption of oil prices, supply chains, and the movement of trade and navigation.
Abdel Fattah believes that changing the objectives of the war is normal, with the prolongation of the confrontations and the difficulty of achieving the initial objectives. He says that the US administration’s goals initially included overthrowing the Iranian regime and eliminating the nuclear and missile programs, before the Strait of Hormuz became a more urgent priority.
As the confrontation shifted to sanctions and the economy, China emerged as a party whose interests intersect with the American strategy towards Iran, as it is the largest buyer of Iranian oil.
However, Abdel Fattah rules out Iran becoming an arena for direct confrontation between the United States and China, considering that the size of the economic and trade interests between Washington and Beijing makes this option costly for both parties.
He points out that imposing US sanctions on Chinese parties is subject to complex economic calculations, in light of Beijing’s possession of commercial and strategic pressure cards, most notably the rare earths market. He points out that, according to him, China possesses about 17 minerals that are used in military, technological and precision industries, which may push the two parties to reach understandings and exceptions that limit the repercussions of escalation.
In contrast, the United States bore a military and strategic cost, with operations consuming large quantities of ammunition and interceptor missiles, in addition to the costs of military deployment and ongoing operations.
Russell believes that the greatest strategic cost to Washington is the decline in its ability to impose regional arrangements from outside the region, noting that the war prompted the countries of the Middle East to re-evaluate the balance of power and deal more with the new regional realities.
A member of the British Conservative Party and a specialist in Iranian affairs, Babak Amemian, provides a more stringent assessment of Tehran’s situation, as he believes in statements to Al-Arabiya that US President Donald Trump’s strategy targeted 3 basic elements for the survival of the regime: leadership, military capabilities, and financial resources.
Amimian says that the US strikes caused significant damage to Iran’s military leadership, logistical structure, supply chains, and industrial capabilities, estimating that up to 80% of the regime’s military capabilities were destroyed.
He believes that the continued military pressure and sanctions put Tehran facing a worsening crisis in securing the resources necessary to continue the war, considering that the regime has become closer to an armed force with limited capabilities.
He adds that the losses extend to the economy, in light of a financial crisis and pressures on production and income, warning that political and ideological extremism will not be enough to address economic problems or improve living conditions.
As the war continues without a settlement, the region appears to be facing different balances than it was before its outbreak. Iran, despite the damage it has suffered, is still able to withstand, while the United States faces the test of converting its military superiority into sustainable political results.
Russell believes that developments are pushing the Middle East towards a balance of power that is more dependent on regional countries and less linked to external influence, considering that Iran’s position in the regional equation may be stronger, without this meaning it possessing absolute power.
It is also considered that the war weakened Israel’s ambition to consolidate its position as the dominant traditional military power in the region, making it likely that it will face greater strategic isolation during the next stage, coinciding with the change in the nature of its relationship with the United States and the reshaping of the regional balance of power.
After 6 months, the equation “victor and vanquished” does not summarize the outcome of the confrontation. Iran suffered significant military and economic losses, but it maintained the ability to continue fighting, while the United States demonstrated clear military superiority that has not yet turned into the full achievement of its goals.
Abdel Fattah confirms that both parties maintained pressure cards despite their losses, while the international community paid part of the price through disruption of energy, trade, and navigation.
While Amimian believes that military and economic pressures are putting Iran before an increasing internal test, Russell believes that the results of the war have reopened the discussion about the future of American influence and the balance of power in the region.
The account statement remains open; The results of the first six months may not alone determine the shape of the region, as much as they will be determined by the ability of Washington and Tehran to transform their remaining power cards into a political settlement in the next stage.
