“Lebanon Debate” – Muhammad Alloush
As the first phase of what is known as “trial areas” in a number of unoccupied southern villages approaches, which is supposed to begin within hours according to the Americans and Israelis, a question arises that precedes all military and political questions: How will the Lebanese army carry out its mission in practice? Will the mission turn into extensive searches of homes and private property in search of weapons, or will the matter remain within the limits of Lebanese law and the applicable judicial mechanisms?
In fact, this issue cannot be approached from a security angle, apart from the issue of respecting Lebanese sovereignty and internal law, in parallel with meeting the obligations demanded by the Americans and Israelis within the framework of consolidating the ceasefire and implementing the framework agreement. The Lebanese army, from a legal standpoint, does not have absolute authority to enter and search homes simply because of suspicions or general information. The sanctity of homes is protected in the Lebanese Constitution, and the principles of criminal trials originally require the presence of permission from the Public Prosecution or the competent judiciary, or the presence of a flagrante delicto or exceptional circumstances determined by law. Therefore, any widespread and random search of homes will directly collide with the Lebanese legal system, before the popular one, and will raise major political and popular objections.
Here the basic dilemma arises. If Israel continues to send lists or coordinates that it says include “suspicious” locations or homes, will the army become obligated to enter every home indicated by Tel Aviv?
The presumed legal answer is no. Israeli information, no matter how accurate, does not automatically turn into judicial evidence inside Lebanon. Rather, it is supposed to be subject to evaluation by the Lebanese security services, and that Lebanese data be available that establishes a judicial request that allows for inspection if necessary. Otherwise, the judiciary will be faced with the serious dilemma of granting legal legitimacy to raids based solely on allegations originating from an enemy state.
In practice, it is expected, according to sources close to the Lebanese negotiating party, that the Lebanese state will seek to find a middle formula, meaning that the army will act based on information verified by Lebanon, and that the judiciary will be a partner in issuing permits when needed, in order to preserve the legal and political cover for the process. But this does not negate the fact that the extent of American and Israeli pressure may push towards expanding the scope of the security movement in an unprecedented way.
The most sensitive question is: What is expected to happen after the end of army operations? If the army announces that it searched a specific area and did not find a weapon, is the file considered closed?
Here comes into play the verification mechanism demanded by Israel and the United States. Tel Aviv does not want to be satisfied with the reports of the Lebanese army, but rather seeks to have a verification system in place to ensure that the region has become free of any Hezbollah military structure, and that weapons will not be brought back into it later. Hence the talk about an increased role for the Ceasefire Supervision Committee, and perhaps about field verification operations based on satellite images, drones, and intelligence information, and perhaps direct intervention. This leads to the most dangerous problem: If Israel says a few days later that the weapons returned to a house that the army had previously searched, will the raid be repeated? If this happens dozens of times, will the south turn into a permanent inspection area? Will the army practically carry out a series of operations based on an Israeli target bank?
These questions directly affect the army’s image in front of its local and national environment. The army is required to maintain internal security, but at the same time it is careful not to appear as if it is working according to an Israeli agenda. On the other hand, this entire process is linked to the Israeli withdrawal file. Official Lebanon considers that any security arrangements must be accompanied by a complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories that are still occupied, while Tel Aviv deals with the matter with a different logic, as it links any final withdrawal to proving the success of the security experiment on the ground, and ensuring that Hezbollah does not return to these areas.
This means that withdrawal may turn into a permanent pressure card. The more Israel demands guarantees, the more it can postpone withdrawal under the pretext that security conditions have not yet matured. Consequently, the Lebanese state may find that whenever it makes a security step, it is required to take an additional step before obtaining a withdrawal.
Therefore, the “pilot zones” constitute a political, legal and sovereign test. It will determine the nature of the relationship between the army and the judiciary, and between the state and the citizen. It will also reveal whether Lebanon is able to impose its legal mechanisms in implementing its obligations, or whether external pressures will impose a new model in which Israeli information becomes the starting point for any security movement within Lebanese territory.
