In the South, the seasons no longer smell like they did before the war.Olive fields, which for decades formed part of the villages’ natural and economic landscape, many of them are either burned, abandoned or inaccessible. As for the greenhouses that used to produce vegetables for Lebanese markets, a large portion of them have turned into torn structures amid empty farmers’ lands.

The recent war hit one of the most fragile pillars of the Lebanese rural economy: the agricultural sector. With the expansion of military operations, displacement, and the disruption of production chains, the crisis began to extend beyond the borders of the south and gradually turn into a direct threat to Lebanese food security.

According to the fourth report of the response plan of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Security Sector issued on May 5, 2026, cumulative agricultural damage exceeded 56 thousand hectares of affected agricultural land in Lebanon, or approximately 22.5% of the total Lebanese agricultural land. More than 18,000 hectares are also located in areas of direct conflict in the south, within 64 towns that are still being targeted and destroyed.

But the seriousness of the scene does not lie only in the size of the affected areas, but also in the nature of the lands and crops affected by the war. The damage mainly affected olive trees, citrus trees, bananas, and small family farms, which are not just seasonal crops, but rather part of the economic, social, and cultural identity of the South.

In many border areas, agriculture has become an almost impossible profession. Farmers are no longer able to access their lands normally, while plowing, irrigation, harvesting, packing, and transportation operations have been disrupted, leading to the collapse of large parts of the agricultural cycle.

These numbers are not based only on government estimates, but also on studies and reports prepared by specialized research and technical bodies, most notably the Food and Agriculture Organization and the National Council for Scientific Research, in addition to the World Food Program as part of updates to the Integrated Interim Classification of Food Security. These studies relied on field surveys and technical analyzes to assess the extent of agricultural damage and losses and their impact on food security and rural livelihoods.

The results of the rapid damage survey showed that hundreds of greenhouses and agricultural and animal production facilities were destroyed or directly damaged, in addition to the death of large numbers of livestock, poultry, beehives, and fish resources, which dealt a severe blow to local food production and the livelihoods of thousands of rural families.

Preliminary studies indicate that the value of productivity losses in the agricultural sector exceeded $530 million, while direct damages exceeded $41 million. However, what is most dangerous, according to assessments, is that production losses far exceed the value of the material damage itself, as a result of preventing access to agricultural land, disrupting agricultural operations, high energy and transportation costs, and disruption of supply and marketing chains.

The war did not only strike the land, but it struck the entire agricultural chain: from seeds and irrigation, to harvesting, storage, marketing and export.

With the expansion of displacement since March, Lebanese food security has entered a more dangerous phase. It is estimated that about 1.24 million people may face high levels of acute food insecurity between April and August 2026, according to the IPC classification, at a time when food and fuel prices have risen significantly.

During the month of March alone, the minimum food survival basket rose by 6%, while the prices of gasoline rose by 41%, diesel fuel by 83%, and cooking gas by 27% between mid-February and mid-April, which led to a decline in the purchasing power of Lebanese families and an unprecedented rise in the cost of agricultural production.

The crisis is no longer limited to farmers in conflict areas only, but has extended to areas hosting displaced people, where thousands of families depend on agriculture as their main source of income. Estimates indicate that the percentage of Lebanese people in need of food support has increased from approximately 18% to approximately 24% of the population, a dangerous indication that the agricultural crisis has turned into a comprehensive social and livelihood crisis.

In the face of this reality, the Ministry of Agriculture, in cooperation with international and local organizations, is trying to move from the stage of disaster management to the stage of organizing the response. The Ministry launched the Agriculture Partners Network, which has become a coordination platform that brings together donors, international organizations, local institutions and the private sector, with the aim of unifying efforts and ensuring that support reaches the most affected farmers.

In addition, in cooperation with the National Council for Scientific Research and the Food Security Sector, a unified information base and digital platform was developed to assess agricultural damage and needs, allowing field data to be collected and analyzed continuously, and to determine priorities according to accurate data.

Through this network, cash and in-kind assistance was provided to farmers, and support for irrigation, solar energy, fodder, agricultural inputs, and agricultural infrastructure, in an attempt to prevent the collapse of what remained of the sector.

But behind all the response plans, the biggest question remains: Can the agricultural sector withstand a long war of this size?

Agriculture has become a direct link to food security, national resilience, and social stability. In a country already on the verge of collapse, Lebanese fields today appear to be fighting a parallel war: a war for survival.