In a remarkable development taking place in Israel, recent estimates and analyzes reveal an unprecedented division within the security establishment regarding dealing with Iran and Hezbollah, as voices are rising warning against over-reliance on military force to achieve strategic goals.
According to a report by journalist Jonah Jeremy Pope in the Jerusalem Post newspaper, the consensus that previously prevailed within the Israeli security establishment following the ceasefire agreements with Hezbollah in November 2024, with Iran in June 2025, and with Hamas in October 2025, has completely disappeared, to be replaced by a sharp disagreement between the current and former leaders.
Although the Israeli government and most security leaders support the continuation of the war on Iran, including launching large-scale air strikes and possibly ground operations in Lebanon, a growing number of senior officials, current and former, strongly oppose this trend, and consider the belief that all problems can be solved through military force “a dangerous illusion.”
In this regard, the statements of some of these officials sparked dissatisfaction within the political and military leadership, after they explicitly affirmed that the complete disarmament of Hezbollah “is not possible through military force alone,” and that the current campaign will not achieve this goal alone.
They also believe that the war on Iran has turned into a “quagmire,” after its goals expanded to include issues such as regime change and the energy crisis, instead of focusing on the nuclear and missile programs. They point out that there have been no serious discussions about the fate of more than 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, which is believed to be stored in underground facilities in Isfahan and Natanz.
According to these estimates, the war should have ended after two or three weeks, and be satisfied with the initial gains, instead of engaging in a long-term and costly war, especially since the idea of regime change in Iran is considered “unrealistic” and was not based on a specialized military assessment.
On the other hand, officials raise sharp questions about the feasibility of continuing the war, pointing out that the current military achievements, including striking economic targets, do not change the strategic picture, but may lead to the erosion of gains over time, in exchange for higher costs on the home front.
As for the Lebanese front, they admit that the current war will not succeed in disarming Hezbollah, and they question the feasibility of opening a second front before the confrontation with Iran is resolved, which has led to the depletion of resources and the fighting of simultaneous battles on two fronts.
The report indicates that Hezbollah, despite entering the war “symbolically” at the beginning, succeeded in carrying out about 600 air attacks in one day during the height of the confrontation, taking advantage of the Israeli Air Force’s focus on the Iranian front, which reduced the effectiveness of operations in Lebanon.
The sources also raise questions about the timing of the ground operation in Lebanon, and why it was not postponed until after the end of the war with Iran, especially since the original plan was to implement it in January, if full air support was available.
In conclusion, these disagreements within the Israeli security establishment reflect a qualitative shift in understanding the war, as the idea of “absolute victory” recedes in the face of a more complex reality, paving the way for strategic reviews that may determine the course of the confrontation in the next stage.
