– محمد علوش
There has been increasing talk recently about an Egyptian initiative aimed at resolving the Lebanese crisis, but well-informed political sources emphasize that much of what is being circulated about this initiative, and about the nature of the relationship between Egypt and “Hezbollah,” requires careful review. The news spreading about the “Egyptian initiative” needs careful analysis, given the intentional mixing of levels of presentation, which gives the impression that what is happening is one integrated initiative, while the truth is completely different.
In this context, sources reveal a fundamental difference between what was reported about ideas presented by the head of Egyptian General Intelligence, Major General Hassan Rashad, in the context of exploring intentions, and what the Egyptian Foreign Minister later returned to Beirut with, carrying a concept closer to Israeli conditions. Surprisingly, according to the sources, the second proposal was worse than the first and further from any realistic possibility of acceptance.
The sources indicate that the essence of the ideas carried by the Egyptian Foreign Minister is based on an unequal deal in two stages: the first includes handing over weapons in southern Lebanon, and north of the Litani towards the south of the Awali River, with the rest of the weapons temporarily frozen, in exchange for a halt to Israeli attacks and the release of a limited number of prisoners, said to be 11 prisoners in the first stage. After that, a second, more dangerous stage begins, based on direct or indirect negotiations between Lebanon and Israel in Cairo, under the title of completing the handover of weapons in the remaining areas, in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal and the release of 9 other prisoners.
These ideas, according to the sources, were not accepted by “Hezbollah,” not because of rigidity or prior rejection of any Egyptian role, but because they go far beyond the ceasefire decision itself. The principle that governs the party’s vision, along with a large part of those concerned with the Lebanese file, is that any transgression of this decision effectively means its cancellation, and therefore the cancellation of Resolution 1701 as well. At this point, Lebanon will not be in the context of consolidating the ceasefire or improving its conditions, but will enter into a completely new negotiating phase, on a vague agreement, and open to all negative possibilities, in light of an already unequal balance of power.
The most dangerous thing, according to the sources, is that these proposals implicitly or explicitly assume negotiation under threat, i.e., the continuation of Israeli military pressure or its use as a tool to impose conditions. This is a rejected principle, because negotiation under threat is not considered a negotiation between two parties, but rather a dictation from a strong party to a party that is intended to concede under pressure. The experience of Lebanon, as well as the experiences of the region, confirm that this path does not lead to stability, but paves the way for new rounds of conflict.
In contrast, stories have been promoted about visits made by the party to Cairo, to suggest the existence of a secret negotiating track or direct participation in this initiative. However, the sources confirm that the party has never visited Egypt, and that its recent foreign visits were limited to a visit to Turkey before the conference on Jerusalem, in which Ammar Al-Moussawi participated, and the most prominent topic discussed during it was related to the Syrian file and its regional repercussions, and ways to reach mutual assurances between the party and the Syrians. There was also a visit to Doha in the context of exchanging views on regional developments, and the possibility that Qatar would play a role in the next stage, especially in light of its intensified coordination with Saudi Arabia regarding the Lebanese file.
As for communication with the Egyptian side, the sources confirm that the most important of these was a meeting held in Beirut between the head of the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, MP Muhammad Raad, and the Egyptian Ambassador to Lebanon.
Based on the above, the “Egyptian initiative,” as it is being promoted in the media, seems closer to a collection of incomplete ideas or an attempt to fill a political void. Knowing that communication between “Hezbollah” and the Egyptians has not been cut off, but the favorable conditions for the success of any initiative are still not available, in light of Israeli intransigence and absolute American support for the Israeli position.
