Almost everyone believes that Resolution 1701 issued in August 2006 has ended, and that the agreement of November 27, 2024, which ended the September aggression and was called in Lebanon “the agreement on special implementation procedures for the resolution,” is only a temporary agreement. This belief is attributed to the fact that Resolution 1701, which stipulated the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and set a deadline for delegating “UNIFIL,” is close to achieving its conditions, as the army has been deployed and a deadline has been set for the departure of international forces in early 2027.
However, some still stress the importance of Resolution 1701 due to the logic of its provisions compared to what is proposed in the future. In contrast, politicians implicitly acknowledge that a new agreement will succeed the previous two, and that the United States of America is pushing in this direction.
From this standpoint, the President’s rush to call for the start of indirect negotiations between Lebanon and Israel under the auspices of Washington is understood, similar to the negotiations on the demarcation of maritime borders, knowing that the current American demand goes beyond that issue. This impetus comes within the framework of an attempt to reduce the scope of the conditions imposed on Lebanon or to prevent the imposition of more severe Israeli conditions.
Everyone knows that Washington is explicitly requesting the start of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. However, the Lebanese reality may explode the country because of this proposal. Therefore, the Presidency worked on “engineering” the proposal, based on the idea of starting a path of indirect negotiations, which allows for preparing the Lebanese interior for this path. This can be said to be a kind of “inducement” or like a breather. It remains that reaching the “second stage” is not guaranteed.
The real dilemma facing the three presidencies is that this path, if implemented as requested by the United States, may open the door to internal chaos, considering that there are active forces, led by Hezbollah, that have the right of “veto” and are able to obstruct, and even push things towards a political and perhaps field confrontation. And the confrontation today will be costly in light of the unrestrained Israeli hand and the open American cover, and with the fragility of the internal situation, Lebanon may suffer unprecedented damage.
This is evidenced by the nature of the ongoing discussion about the formation of the Lebanese delegation. There is currently talk of developing the negotiation mechanism that was adopted during the maritime demarcation negotiations, so that the delegation turns from a military one supported technically to a military-technical-diplomatic-legal delegation, through the participation of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and perhaps Public Works, in addition to experts in international law and border demarcation, who are seconded from the First Presidency in cooperation with the relevant authorities. It is also proposed to involve political figures who work as advisors to senior references.
Such a development in form may be accepted by Washington on the basis of “preparing the conditions” internally, but it will stipulate that it later turns into direct negotiations dealing with sensitive issues such as the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied sites, the cessation of attacks and assassinations, and the release of prisoners. These are files that require the presence of an official Lebanese party to sign them, and it is likely that Washington will insist that the President sign them, as he is, according to the constitution, the authority in concluding treaties, which gives any agreement political and legal value.
Washington, along with Israel, realizes that they are looking for real agreements with countries that are still within the circle of conflict, on the basis of fortified “state-to-state” agreements, and not vague agreements or without an official signature as happened in the agreement of November 27, which was not accompanied by any presidential signature.
In addition to American and Israeli pressure, the current American political climate reinforces the impetus towards negotiations, as information indicates that one of the tasks of the new American ambassador to Beirut, Michael Issa, is to replace the current ceasefire agreement and sponsor the conclusion of a different agreement between Lebanon and Israel. However, Issa’s task will be procedural with the assistance of Morgan Ortagus, while the actual driver in Washington remains the US State Department, specifically the proposed file manager John Reiberon, whose appointment as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs in the ministry is being discussed by the US Congress today. That is, the decision in the Lebanese file will return to the US State Department as the legally authorized entity to enshrine agreements.
It remains necessary to monitor the position of Hezbollah, as it is a fundamental force in the Lebanese equation.
Hezbollah clearly declares its rejection of the idea of direct negotiations with Israel, a position expressed repeatedly by influential leaders in it. Rather, the party considers that simply entering into direct negotiations means Lebanon’s involvement in the path of the “Abraham Accords,” that is, its transformation into a normalized state. Consequently, the party will consider that the authority is تجاوزing the will of the majority of the Lebanese, and will act on this basis as an opposition force capable of causing trouble, supported by its ally the Amal Movement and others, in rejection of any orientation towards “peace” while the blood of the southerners has not yet dried, and because the price will be putting the resistance’s weapons on the table.
Between the option of negotiations and the specter of war, there is a fine line, but what is certain is that neither path will be without a price.
source: 961 today
